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ANTITRUST DURING NATIONAL EMERGENCIES: II*

Thomas K. Fishert

T

HE effects of the Depressions of 1893 and 1929, the Panic of
1907, and World War I upon the enforcement and substantive
content of the antitrust law were examined in the first part of this
article. Because of the change in government policy toward the law as
effected in the early months of the Roosevelt administration, the Depression of 1929 was divided into the years under the Hoover administration and the years under the Roosevelt administration. We have
noted that during the former period only twenty-five actions were
brought to enforce the law. The legislative policy of that administration in respect to the maintenance of competition remained unchanged,
however, with no positive action being taken upon the numerous suggestions offered by private groups and individuals for suspension or
modification of the law.

E. The N. I. R. A. Period
The purpose of the Congress in enacting the Sherman Act was to
free the fl.ow of interstate and foreign commerce from certain existingand future obstructions. These were obstructions resulting from trade
agreements among competitors and the monopolization of trade by one
or more individuals or corporations. The emergency legislation enacted
by the Congress in the first part of the Roosevelt administration was for
essentially the same purpose. But the obstructions impeding commerce
at this time were of a different character. No private groups were responsible for the substantial cessation of trade and commerce; rather,
impersonal forces world-wide in scope had stalled the productive facilities of the nation. Since the impediments in trade were not the result
of agreements among competitors or of monopolization, the suggestions
which had been advanced, and rejected, during the Hoover administration were accepted as the basis for a new approach to the current problems.
The National Industrial Recovery Act 117 was passed in June of

*

The first part of this article appeared in the May issue of the REvrnw, supra,
page 969.
t A.B., J.D., Michigan; member, New York bar.-Ed.
117 Act of June 16, 1933, c. 90, Title I, 48 Stat. L. 195; amended by Joint
Resolutions of June 19, 1934, c. 677, 48 Stat. L. 1183; and June 14, 1935, c. 246,
-49 Stat. L. 375.
The background of the act and the story of its drafting are related in RICHBERG,
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1933 as the principal legislation desig.n,eq for the alleviation of existing
economic conditions. In its declaration of policy a change from the
theory of national trade supported by competition to one founded on
co-operation was apparent. "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
Congr~s," the act recited, "to provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of cooperative
action among trade groups...." Pursuant to section 3 of the act, codes
of fair competition, formulated by trade or industrial associations or
groups, became binding -upon the applicable trade or industry when
approved by the President. One of the conditions to Presidential approval of a code was that its provisions would tend to e:ffectuate the
•policy of the act. The policy declaration included: "to avoid undue
restriction of production ( except as may be temporarily required)."
As a further condition to his approval, the President was to be satisfied that the code was not designed to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and would not discriminate against
them. The nonmonopolistic condition was implemented by a positive
prohibition against "monopolies or monopolistic practices." Whether
the codes violated the positive prohibition was determinable through
the judicial process rather than, as in. the case of the aforementioned
condition, subject merely to the findings of the President from which
no appeal was provided. Section 4(b) of the act granted the President
power to require the licensing of trades and industries whenever he
found that "destructive wage or price cutting or other activities contrary to the policy of this title are being practiced in any trade or industry or any subdivision thereof." 118
The President was also authorized to enter into agreements with,
and to approve agreements between, persons engaged in a trade, industry or labor organization, anq trade or industrial organizations. Prior to
executing or approving such agreements he was directed to find that
•the terms thereof were consistent with the requirements of the condiTHE RAINBOW 106 et seq. (1936). As originally enacted, Title I was to be operative
for two years, or less if the President or the Congress should declare that the emergency
had ended. The Joint Resolution of June 14, 1935, \t:!Xtended the effective date of
the act until April 1, 1936. This resolution also repealed all provisions of Title I
delegating power to the President to approve or prescribe codes of fair competition.
Such action by the Congress followed the Supreme Court's decision in A. L. A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935), whicli
held unconstitutional the delegation of power to the President to approve and prescribe
codes of fair competition pursuant to section 3 of the act.
.
118 The licensing power was effective ,for not more than one year after the date
of the enactment of the act. It was never exercised by the President. l C. C. H.,
FEDE~AL TRADE REGULATION SERVICE, 7th ed., 1f 812· (1932-1937).
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tions above mentioned for his approval of a code. No positive prohibition against monopolies or monopolistic practices was set forth in
respect to these agreements.119 Another section of the act provided
that, where no code had been submitted for a trade or industry, the
President could prescribe a code for such trade or industry when he
found abuses existing therein which were inimical to the public interest
and contrary to the policy of the act.120 All codes were to contain certain enumerated provisions guaranteeing to employees the right to
organize and bargain collectively, and to be free from the interference
of employers in i.-espect to their union activities.121
Section 5 provided:
"While this title is in effect ( or in the case of a license, while
section 4(a) is in effect) and for sixty days thereafter, any code,
agreement, or license approved, prescribed, or issued and in effect
under this title, and any action complying with the provisions
thereof taken during such period, shall be exempt from the provisions of the antitrust laws of the United States."
On its face and as interpreted in the Congressional debates the act
contained several significant departures from the antitrust law. Of
first importance was the spirit which pervaded the new law. Rehabilitation of a disorganized economy and its stabilization thereafter were
to be undertaken through co-operation among competitors and between an industry as a unit and the government. The act represents "a
supreme effort to stabilize for all time the many factors which make
119 48 Stat. L. 197, § 4( a) ( I 93 3). The voluntary agreements were binding only
upon those persons who signed them and violation thereof was a matter of contract
right, no statutory penalties being provided. See LYoN, THE NATIONAL RECOVERY
ADMINISTRATION 30, 900 ( I 93 5), for reference to the President's Re-employment
Agreement of July, 1933. When a code was approved for an industry, it superseded
the agreement.
120 48 Stat. L. 196, § 3(d) (1933). This power was never exercised by the
President. 1 C. C.H., FEDER.AL TR.ADE REGULATION SERVICE, 7th ed., 1f 808 (19321937).
121 48 Stat. L. 198, § 7(a) (1933). Section 9 related specifically to the petroleum
industry. The President was empowered to initiate before the Interstate Commerce
Commission proceedings necessary to prescribe regulations to control the operation of
oil pipe lines and to fix reasonable, compensatory rates for the transportation of petroleum. He was authorized to prohibit the interstate and foreign transportation of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of state
quotas; held, unconstitutional in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55
S. Ct. 241 (1935). He was also authorized to institute proceedings to divorce from
any holding company any pipe-Iirie company controlled by such holding company
which pipe-line company by unfair practices or by exorbitant rates tended to create a
monopoly. This power was never exercised by the President. I C. C. H., FEDERAL
TR.ADE REGULATION SER.VICE, 7th ed., 1f 825 (1932-1937).
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for the prosperity of the nation and the preservation of American standards," the President declared as he signed the law.122 The provisions
incorporated into the codes, examined at a later point herein, will make
clear the importance which should be accorded the spirit embodied in
the act.
Turning to a consideration of particular sections of the N. I. R. A.,
we may note that they left unimpaired section 2 of the Sherman Act,
which pertains to monopolizing or attempts to monopolize, and that the
power~ of the Federal Trade Commission'under its organic law were
not a:ffected.123 However, tlie exemption of approved codes and agreements, and action complying therewith, from the provisions of the antitrust law,124 opened the door to co-operative action previously forbidden by section I of the Sherman Act. In order to reach this conclusion
it was first necessary to disregard the language of Chief Justice White
in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,1 25 wherein he suggested that the
terms "monopoly" and "restraint of trade" were synonymous. His construction would have rendered null the exempting clause in the
N. I. R. A., since monopoly and monopolistic practices were expressly
forbidden by another 'Section thereof.
Restriction of production pursuant to action under a code was contemplated by the framers of the act. Overproduction had been a major
"evil" of the distressed economy, and one of the policies of the act was
"to avoid undue restriction of production ( except as may be temporarily required)" thereby strongly implying that there could be a "due
restriction" and a "temporary undue restriction" of production.126 The
122 Quoted in LYON, Tm;; NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 3 (1935).
The President's judgment of the act was in these words: "History probably will record
the National Industrial Recovery Act as the most important and far-reaching legislation
ever enacted by the American Congress."
123 Section 3(b) of the N. I. R. A., 48 Stat. L. 196 (1933), provided: "but
nothing in this title shall be construed to impair the powers of the Federal Trade
Commission under such Act, as amended."
124 The term ."antitrust laws" is defined in § l of the Clayton Act to include the
Sherman Act, the antitrust provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act, as amended, and the
Clayton Act. Part I, 40 M1cH. L. REv. 969 at 970, note 3, supra.
125 221 U.S. lat 61, 31 S. Ct. 502 (1911).
126 Although the cases involving control of production are few in number tliey
lead to tlie conclusion that such action, resulting from agreement among competitors,
would be u¥1awful under § I of the Sherman Act. See American Column & Lumber
Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 42 S. Ct. u4 (1921); Gibbs v. McNeeley,
(C. C. A. 9th, 1902) 118 F. 120. In National Assn. of Window Glass Mfrs. v.
United States, 263 U. S. 403, 44 S. Ct. 148 (1923), and Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U. S. 344, 53 S. Ct. 471 (1933), restriction of production was
not involved.
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framers of the bill believed that "exchange of information, which serves
to make competition rational instead of blind and destructive and which
thus expands trade and commerce" was unlawful under the antitrust
law. The exchange of such information, including establishment of
open price systems, was to be permitted under the codes.121 Section
4(b) gave the President power to require licensing for the continuation
-of a trade or industry in which he found destructive price cutting being
practiced. This section implied that the codes might contain provisions
preventing such price cutting. Yet if to effect this end members of an
industry gave their code authority the power to fix a specific price or a
minimum price, would this not be violative of the prohibition against
monopolistic practices? 128 Support for a negative answer to this ques121 77 CoNG. REc. 5836, 5840 (1933). The legality of plans for the collection
and dissemination of trade statistics has been passed upon in the following cases: American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 42 S. Ct. II4 (1921);
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371, 43 S. Ct. 607 (1923);
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 45 S. Ct. 578, 592
(1925); Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 45 S. Ct.
586, 592 (1925); and, after the enactment of the N. I. R. A., Sugar Institute v.
United States, 297 U. S. 553, 56 S. Ct. 629 (1936). The decisions have not considered particular phases of the plans but have considered each plan as a whole in
order to determine whether its purpose or effect was to fix prices or limit production
or otherwise unduly restrain trade. In the Maple Flooring case, the Court stated ( 268
U. S. at 586): "We decide only that trade associations or combinations of persons or
corporations which openly and fairly gather and disseminate information as to the cost
of their product, the volume of production, the actual price which the product has
brought in past transactions, stocks of merchandise on hand, approximate cost of transportation from the principal point of shipment to the points of consumption, as did
these defendants, and who, as they did, meet and discuss such information and statistics
without however reaching or attempting to reach any agreement or any concerted
a<:tion with respect to prices or production or restraining competition, do not thereby
engage in unlawful restraint of (iOmmerce." The scope of lawful activities as thus
enumerated would suggest that the framers of the bill had misconstrued the effect of
decisions by the Supreme Court. The framers may, however, have had in mind the
following parctices, the doubtful legality of which is implied in certain decisions:
agreements to adhere to filed prices until new price filings become effective, Linseed
Oil and Sugar Institute cases; agreements providing for a lapse of time between the
filing of prices and the time when these prices become effective, comparable in legal
effect to agreements to adhere to filed prices; agreements providing for disclosure of
individual cost, price and production data, Linseed Oil and Maple Flooring cases;
nonavailability of the collected information to purchasers, American Column & Lumber,
Linseed Oil and Maple Flooring cases; persuasion in respect to price or production
policies, American Column & Lumber case; agreements providing for filing of current
and future prices, Linseed Oil case, but cf. Sugar Institute case.
128 See Handler, "Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws," 3 2 CoL. L. R&v.
179 at 256 (1932); Handler, "The National Industrial Recovery Act," 19 A. B. A. J.
440 at 443 (1933); cf. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 47
S. Ct. 377 (1927).
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tion could be found in light of the changes made in an amendment
to the bill offered by Senator Borah. His amendment read:
"Provided, that such code or codes shall not permit combinations in restraint of trade, price fixing, or other monopolistic
practices." 129
The conference committee changed the amendment to the form in
which it was ultimately passed:
"Provided, that such codes or codes shall not permit monopolies
or monopolistic practices."
Senator Borah interpreted the action of the conference committee to
mean that the codes might lawfully contain provisions restraining trade
and fixing prices. 130
The possibilities promised by the N. I. R. A. for concerted action
of doubtful validity under the antitrust law were realized in the provisions incorporated into hundreds of codes which were approved by
the President. Of particular interest for our purposes were the trade
practice regulations concerning price control, production control, distribution control, and open price systems.
Direct control of prices was accomplished by the establishment of
minimum prices and the prohibition of sales below cost. There were
ninety-three codes i~ which a floor for prices was in effect.131 The establishment of minimum prices took two forms: first, the power. was granted
to code authorities to fix minimum prices; secondly, emergency minimum price fixing was permitted when the administrator determined
that an emergency existed/32 One hundred and ten basic and one hundred and eleven supplementary codes contained provisions permitting
the establishment of_ emergen~ minimum prices, but in only eleven
129 77 CoNG. REc. 5246 (1933). This amendment was agreed to by the Senate,
id. 5247.
180 77 CoNG. REc. 5834 (1933). The following articles, written shortly after the
act was passed, discuss the problems raised in connection with the antitrust law:
Handler, "The National Industrial Recovery Act," 19 A. B. A. J. 440 (1933);
Wahrenbrock, "Federal Anti-Trust Law and the National Industrial Recovery Act," 31
MICH. L. REv. 1009 (1933); Ryan, "Industrial Recovery and the Anti-Trust Laws,"
1.3 BoST. UNIV. L. REv. 577 (1933).
131. "The National Recovery Administration," H. Doc. 158, 75th Cong., 1st
sess. (1937), p. 132.
·
132 See BACKMAN, GovERNMENT PRICE-FIXING 46-51 (1938). The conditions
specified by the National Recovery Administration which might indicate the existence
of an emergency were: "(a) impairment of employment or wage scales; (b) particularly
high mortality of enterprises, especially small enterprises; or (c) panic in an industry
or other special conditions." Quoted in id. 49.
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cases was an emergency declared by the administrator.138 Provisions
prohibiting sales below cost were more frequent than those establishing
minimum prices. The "cost" basis employed was usually that of the
individual producer.134
Production control provisions, present in ninety-one codes,135 extended not only to current supply but also to limitations on potential
productive facilities. Current supply was regulated by limitations on
machine and plant hours, and the assignment of production quotas
to an industry and to the individual members thereof. Approximately
fifty codes contained provisions stipulating that persons· desiring to
build new plant capacity must first satisfy the administrator that public
necessity and convenience required such additional facilities. Although
these provisions carried the power to exclude new enterprise, a record
of the disposition of applications for permission to build new plant
capacity shows that in most cases the applications were granted. 186
Provisions relating to control over the distribution of goods and
services were numerous. Among the more important were the establishment of defined classes of customers, regulation of discounts according to quantity or customer class, restriction of sales to certain classes
of enterprises, and resale price maintenance contracts.137 Open price systems were set up in four hundred and twenty-two codes.138 Through
the revelation of current prices it was believed that order would emerge
from the chaos of blind competition. In pursuing this ideal some of the
systems provided for identification of individual price lists, a lapse of
time between the filing of prices and the time when these prices could
188

Id. 49.

134

Jd. 5 I.

"The National Recovery Administration," H. Doc. 158, 75th Cong., 1st sess.
(1937), p. 139.
136 BACKMAN, GOVERNMENT PRICE-FIXING 59-62 (1938).
137 "The National Recovery Administration," H. Doc. 158, 75th Cong., Ist
sess. (1937), p. 152; LYoN, THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 651 et seq.
(1935).
Agreements among competitors which defined classes of customers and to whom
sales might be made have been held illegal under the antitrust law. See Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 34 S. Ct. 951 (1914).
Agreements regulating the amount of discounts are comparable in legal effect to agreements fixing prices, since "price" is established only after consideration is given to all
the terms and conditions of sale determining what is ultimately paid by the customer.
Cf. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 47 S. Ct. 377 (1927),
and Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553, 56 S. Ct. 629 (1936). Resale
price maintenance agreements have been held unlawful under the antitrust law. See
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 31 S. Ct. 376
(1911).
138 LYoN, THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 610 et seq. (1935).
185
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become effective for sales, commonly called the "waiting period," and
adherence to filed prices until new price filings became effective. Approximately one hundred and fifty codes containing open price systems
made no provision for dissemination of the price information to
buyers.139
Numerous suits were brought to enjoin violations of the code provisions., The unconstitutionality of the act and actions pursuant thereto
was most frequently urged as a defense to such complaints.140 Seldom
did the defendants contend merely that the code provisions alleged to
have been violated by them were unauthorized under the act or were
monopolistic practices and hence prohibited. Where these defenses
were set forth, defendants usually prevailed. In United States v.
Rogles,141 the government sued to enjoin defendants from selling coal
below the minimum retail price established by the code authority. Defendants' argument that the fixing of a minimum price constituted a
monopolistic practice was accepted by the court. The court held:
". . . This act does grant authority to establish codes of fair
competition for trade and industry. But the statute expressly
prohibits the approval of any code or codes which 'permit monopolies or monopolistic practices.' Price fixing is such a practice, and is
condemned, rather than authorized by the act. Underselling is
not 'unfair competition' as that term has always been understood." 142
In Mississippi Valley Hardwood Co. v. McClanahan 143 complainant
asked for an injunction against the United States attorney to prevent
arrest, indictment and prosecution for violating the minimum prices
139 Id. 610 et seq.; "The National Recovery Administration," H. Doc. 158~
75th Cong., 1st sess. (1937), p. 144 et seq. A survey of open price systems under the
codes was made by the Brookings Institution. LYON and ABRAMSON, THE EcoNOMICS
OF OPEN PRICE SYSTEMS (1936).
See the following for analyses of the administration and code provisions of the
N. I. R. A.: "The National Recovery Administration," supra and LYON, supra; for
analysis of price and production controls: BACKMAN~ GoVERNMENT PRICE-FIXING
38-70· (1938); for the part played by trade associations under the act: WHITNEY,
TRADE AssocIATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL CoNTROL (1934); for Congressional hearings
on the operation of the act: HEARINGS BEFORE SENATE CoMMITTEE oN FINANCE, PuRsuANT TO S. REs. 79, 74th Cong., 1st sess., Mar. 7-April 18, 1935.
140 A compilation of the cases may be found in I C. C. H., FEDERAL TRADE
REGULATION SERVICE, 7th ed.,
801-853 (1932-1937).
141 (D. C. Mo. 1935) 9 F. Supp. 857.
142 Id. at 858. The same reasoning was applied in State ex rel. Schneider v.
Riesenberg, (Ohio Com. Pleas Ct. 1934) 33 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 21, 3 C. C. H.,
FEDERAL TRADE REGULATION SERVICE, 7th ed., 1f 7252.
148 (D. C. Tenn. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 388.
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fixed under the Hardwood Lumber Code. The court granted the relief
prayed for, holding that there was nothing in the act which granted
authority for the fixing of prices. "Price regulation is the antithesis of
competition, fair or otherwise," the court stated.144 But in United
States v. Lee Wilson & Co. 145 the court held that the "policy and intent
of the Act was to confer power to fix prices." In arriving at this conclusion the court noted that section 4(b), which authorized the President
to license one who destructively cut prices, implied that at the time
of such price cutting there had been a fixed price which was cut.146
The effect of the N. I. R. A. upon acts which allegedly were illegal
under a state antitrust statute was passed upon in State v. Standard Oil
Co. 141 Defendants were charged with having violated the Texas antitrust law by reason of an agreement among them in r929 to accept and
observe the Federal Trade Commission Code of Ethics applicable to
the marketing of petroleum products. The court compared the provisions of the Code of Ethics with sections of the N. I. R. A. Petroleum
Code and, finding both to be substantially alike, applied the commonlaw rule that to support a recovery of penalties the acts complained of
must be illegal at the time the punishment is inflicted unless the repealing statute carries a saving clause. Inasmuch as the N. I. R. A.
contained no saving clause, the court held that the acts of defendants,
though they may have been illegal in the past, were now lawful by
reason of provisions in an approved code.148
10

Id. 388. Cf. United States v. Sutherland, (D. C. Mo. 1934) 9 F. Supp. 204

at 205.
145

ed,.

(D. C. Ark. 1934) 3 C. C. H., FEDERAL TRADE REGULATION SERVICE, 7th

1f 7267, not officially reported.

146 The court also commented upon the economic necessity for price fixing in the
following words: "I think another step has taken place in the public mind, fixing it as
public policy, and that is, that with mass production competition cannot fix the price
of commodities. Such competition means the destruction of smaller industries ana
power must be exercised by the legislature in order to prevent the destruction of these
industries and prevent unemployment."
147 (D. C. Travis County, Tex. 1933) 3 C. C. H., FEDERAL TRADE REGULATieN SERVICE, 7th ed., 1f 7066, affd. on other grounds (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 82
S. W. (2d) 402.
148 The common-law rule was well established that on the repeal of a statute
without any reservation of its penalties, all criminal proceedings taken under it were
abated. Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch (9 U. S.) 281 (1809); United States v.
Tynen, II Wall. (78 U. S.) 88 (1870). But this rule of construction was changed
in so far as the federal law is concerned by the Act of Congress of Feb. 25, 1871,
which provides that the repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or
extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the
repealing statute shall so expressly provide. 16 Stat. L. 432 (1871), I U.S. C. (1940),
§ 29. Although the N. I. R. A. only suspended the operation of the antitrust law, it is
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In view of the fact that a large portion of American business was
operating under codes of fair competition, it is not surprising to find
that during the twenty-three months prior to the Schechter 149 decision
the Antitrust Division brought 011-ly eight petitions, and but ten indictments were returned alleging violations of the antitrust law. In at least
five of the eighteen cases defendants maintained that the enactment of
the N. I. R. A. had legalized the restraint of trade allegedly resulting
from their acts. But in the absence of a showing that the acts complained
of were embraced within the protective bounds of an approved code,
the courts uniformly found against defendants on this point.150
At the time of the enactment of the N. LR. A. there were one hundred and twelve consent decrees which had been entered in antitrust
proceedings.m Under these decrees defendants were enjoined from
doing, individually or in concert with others, many practices embraced
within the provisions of codes of fair competition. For these defendants
a problem arose in connection with the preparation of and performance under codes. To have agreed with competitors in the preparation of a code upon the establishment of minimum prices or production
quotas would have violated the injunctive sections in many of their
clear that the provisions of the Act of l 871 would be applicable thereto, since suspension and repeal differ only as to the period of time the affected statute is inoperative.
Maresca v. United States, (C. C. A. 2d, 1921) 277 F. 727 at 737. Furthermore, the
provisions of the Act of l 8 7 I "are to be treated as if incorporated in and as a part
of subsequent enactments." Great Northern Ry. v. United States, 208 U. S. 452 at
46 5, 28 S. Ct. 313 ( l 908). In examining the scope of the conflict between the N. I.
R. A. code provisions and the Texas antitrust law, the state court, it is submitted, should
have considered and followed the rule of construction set forth in the Act of 1871. Cf.
Ex parte Lamar, (C. C. A. --zd, 1921) 274 F. 160, affd. Lamar v. United States, 260
u. s. 7II, 43 s. Ct. 251 (1923).
149 A. L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct.
837 (1935), holding unconstitutional the delegation of power to the President to
approve and prescribe codes of fair competition pursuant to § 3 'of the N. I. R. A.
150 United States v. Dress Creators League, United States v. Party Dress Guild,
United States v. Half-Size Dress Guild, (D. C. N. Y. 1934) 3 C. C. H., FEDERAL
TRADE REGULATION SERVICE, 7th ed., 1f 7260 (not officially reported); United States
v. Fish Credit Assn., (D. C. N. Y. 1935) id.1f 7351 (not officially reported); United
States v. Needle Trade Workers' Industrial Union, (D. C. N. Y. 1935) IO F. Supp.
201. See also National Foundry Co. v. Alabama Pipe Co., (D. ·C. N. Y. 1934) 7 F.
Supp. 823.
151 Donovan and McAllister, "Consent Decrees in the Enfo.rcement of the Federal Anti-Trust Laws," 46 HARV.
REv. 885 (1933). No additional consent decrees
were entered between the end of 1932, when the Donovan and McAllister study was
completed, an~ June 1933, when the N. I. R. A. was passed. See THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws (1938).
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consent decrees.152 To ha.ve refused to join with competitors in
the preparation of codes would not have resolved the problem for all
of these defendants, inasmuch as under certain codes they were required, in order to continue to sell to, or purchase as, wholesalers, to
enter into minimum resale price maintenance contracts. The answer to
the problem, of course, was for defendants to petition for a modification
of their decrees so as expressly to permit them to carry out the purposes
of the N. I. R. A. In only ten instances was this procedure followed. 168
The remaining defendants apparently were content to rely upon the
belief that contempt proceedings would not be instituted for such a
technical--and public spirited-violation.
The legality of joint action taken by certain oil companies during
the N. I. R. A. period was passed upon by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,154 familiarly known as the Madison
Oil case. This decision is of major importance for several reasons. It
indicates the strict approach the Court, as presently "reconstructed,"
will take toward co-operative action among competitors although their
endeavors during a national emergency may be directed toward the
elimination of competitive "evils." It limits the application of the doc152 Suspension of the antitrust law upon Presidential approval of a code did not
nullify the continued binding effect of decrees previously entered in antitrust cases.
See note 149, supra. After a decree is entered, the lawfulness of defendants' acts,
in so far as they are within the scope of the decree, are adjudged by its terms.
153 ln United States v. Tanners Products Co., (D. C. Ill. 1933) 3 C. C. H.,
FEDERAL TRADE REGULATION SERVICE, 7th ed., 1f 7061, not officially reported, defendants were unsuccessful in their application for modification, the petition having
been filed prior to approval of a code for their industry. The petition was dismissed
without prejudice to their right to apply for modification after a code had been approved. But the court d~d expressly permit defendants to associate "amongst themselves and with others to formulate a proposed code of fair competition for the purpose
of submitting the same for approval to the President. . . ." Modification of consent
decrees was granted in United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, (D. C. Cal.
1933) id., 1f 7063, not officially reported; United States v. Southern Hardware Jobbers
Assn., (D. C. Va. 1933) id., 1f 7083, not officially reported; and in the following
unreported cases: United States v. American Thread Co.; United States v. Interlaken
Mills; United States v. American Assn. of Wholesale Opticians; United States v. Barbers' Supply Dealers Assn.; United States v. National Peanut Cleaners & Shellers Assn.;
United States v. American Amusement Ticket Mfrs. Assn.; United States v. Wool
Institute. See Temporary National Economic Committee Monograph No. 16, "Antitrust in Action," Appendix D, pp. 126-128 (1941); THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws
(1938).
m. 310 U.S. 150, 60 S. Ct. 8II (1940), petition for rehearing denied 310 U.S.
658, 60 S. Ct. 1091 (1940). Venue was laid in the District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin, the trial taking place at Madison in the fall of 1937.
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trine as announced in the United States Steel 155 and Fosburgh 166 cases,
namely, that joint action by competitors undertaken with the approval
or at the request of public officials who lack authority for their action
does, nevertheless, thereby have some "assurance" of being a reasonable restraint of trade. It contains language which would appear to
overrule the decision in the Appalachian Coals 151 case. Finally, the
decision stands as a caveat for all business managers who undertake
joint action in times of a national emergency and who may stand trial
for their conduct after the emergency has passed.
Defendant oil companies were charged with having conspired for
the purpose of raising and fixing the tank car price of gasoline in the
East Texas and Mid-Continent spot markets. 158 The manner in which
such conspiracy was effectuated was alleged to have been by means of
two concerted gasoline buying programs for th~ purchase from independent refiners in spot transactions of large quantities of gasoline in
the East Texas and Mid-Continent fields at "uniform, high, and at
times progressively increased prices." 159
The evidence showed that in January, 1935, a meeting was held
, which was attended by representatives of defendant companies and
independent oil refiners. A committee was-formed "to consider ways
and means of establishing and maintaining an active and strong
tank car market on gasoline." 160 The government contended that the
evidence respecting the activities of this committee proved the existence of an agreement to fix the spot market prices.161 The com155 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 25 l U. S. 417, 40 S. Ct. 293
(1920), discussed in Part I, 40 MrcH. L. REV. 969 at 985.
156 Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1923) 291 F.
29, discussed in Part I, 40 MrcH. L. REv. 969 at 991.
157 Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 53 S. Ct. 471 (1933),
discussed in Part I, 40 MrcH. L. REv. 969 at 1003.
158 Spot market sales are between refiners and jobbers or consumers, with shipment usually within ten or fifteen days thereafter; contrasted with this type 0f sale is
the long-term supply contract, effective for a year or more, and covering all the purchaser's gasoline requirements during the contract period.
159 3 IO U. S. at 167. The indictment also charged defendants with having arbitrarily exacted-by reason of the provisions of_ the jobber' contracts which made the
price to the jobber dependent on the average spot market price-large sums of money
from jobbers with whom they had such contracts, and with having intentionally raised
the general level of retail prices in the Mid-Western market. But the indictment failed
to charge that defendants had agreed upon uniform jobber contracts and uniform retail
prices, and during the trial, government counsel disclaimed any charge upon either 0f
these matters.
160 310 U.S. 150 at 178.
161 Brief for the United States l 5-34, .39-48, submitted to the Supreme Court.
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mittee had proposed a plan, the government argued, whereby the
defendant companies were to purchase on the spot market all gasoline which could not be sold by the independent refiners at the
price fixed by the committee. Allocations for the purchase from particular independent refiners of their "surplus" gasoline, i.e., gasoline
not bringing the fixed price, were made by the committee. Defendants
then proceeded to buy this gasoline pursuant to the agreed upon allocation at prices established by the committee.
Defendants presented evidence and made offers of proof which they
believed showed an entirely different picture than that for which the
government contended. Since I 926 the excessive production of crude
oil had driven the price down to a point where it was unprofitable for
many wells to continue in operation. Conservation, on the other hand,
required that such wells continue operating, for once abandoned, subsurface changes made it extremely difficult and very expensive to
operate again. Proration laws were passed by several states but were
of little effect. "Hot oil" ( oil unlawfully produced under the proration restrictions) and "hot gasoline" (gasoline refined from the unlawfully produced crude oil) continued to flow into the market, with
hot oil selling substantially below the price for legal crude oil and hot
gasoline, therefore, costing less and sometimes selling for less than the
cost of legal gasoline. Deprived of its ordinary outlets, legal gasoline
was sold at below-normal prices.
Adding to the depressed condition of the petroleum industry was
what defendants described as a competitive evil, namely, "distress"
gasoline. The conditions purportedly responsible for this competitive
evil were substantially as follows. The independent refiners were under
contractual obligation to take all the legal crude oil produced by their
respective sellers. Because of the necessity of fulfilling their own contracts with long-standing customers, and the high percentage of overhead costs, these refiners were unable to curtail their refining operations.
Lacking storage facilities, the refiners had to dump on the market at
forced-sale prices all gasoline which could not be disposed of through
sales either under long-term supply contracts or to jobbers and brokers
wp.o shopped around on the spot market. The subnormal price brought
by the distress gasoline had its depressing effect on the general spot
market price level.162
During the life of the N. I. R. A., repeated efforts were made by
the Administrator of the Oil Code to "stabilize the oil industry upon
Brief for the Respondents 103-II2; Appendix A to Brief for the Respondents
5, submitted to the Supreme Court.
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a profitable basi~." 163 Some success was attained. In September, 1933,
crude oil was selling at a dollar a barrel, a rise of about seventy-five
cents from the previous June low. But the restoration of the price of
gasoline to parity with crude oil failed, partly because of the continued
flow of hot oil and hot gasoline after the decision of the Supreme
Court164 had invalidated section 9 ( c) of the N. I. R. A. and partly because the problem of distress gasoline still remained acute. Independent
refiners, caught between the high crude oil price and the extremely low
wholesale gasoline price, suffered losses in spite of efficiency in operation,165
At the January, 1935, meeting the independent refiners had complained of the failure of refined gasoline to reach a parity with crude
oil, and of the harmful effect of hot and distress gasoline. It was their
view that "if we were going to have general stabilization in retail markets, we must have some sort of a firm market in the tank car market." 160 Defendants argued that the plan then proposed by the committee above referred to was merely to buy distress gasoline at the fair
market price, i.e., the price established through sales of gasoline by independent refiners to jobbers. Whereas the government 'contended a
price was agreed upon by the committee and purchases were then made
to maintain the price, defendants contended the function of the committee was merely to determine, with the help of the independent
refiners, the amount of distress gasoline on hand, and to notify the
defendants of the same. Defendants argued that price was not fixed
arbitrarily by the committee, its only function in the price line being
the recommendation that defendants should not chisel on the fair
market prices in their purchases of distress gasoline. With the removal
of hot oil and gasoline from the market by virtue of the Connally Act,167
and with the elimination of distress gasoline, defendants, of course,
expected the spot market price level to rise, but they disclaimed any
fixing of price. To meet the inference of noncompetition in prices drawn
310 U.S. 150 at 172.
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935). See
note 121, supra.
165 Adding further chaos to the industry were the extensive price wars in the retail
markets during 1934. The Petroleum Administrative Board, appointed in an advisory
capacity to the Secretary of Interior, who was designated by the President as Administrator of the Petroleum Code, worked closely with one of the individual defendants who had been asked by the board to lead a co-operative movement to deal with
the price wars. Attempts were made to eliminate this destructive price cutting by persuading suppliers to see to it that their purchasers resold at a fair price.
166 310 U.S. 150 at 178.
16 r 49 Stat. L. 30 (1935), 15 U, S. C. (1940); § 715 et seq.
168
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by the government from the fairly constant level at which prices remained for seven months, defendants called attention to other factors
which they believed were largely responsible for this stabilization: the
control of crude oil production under the N. I. R. A. and by interstate
compact, the Connally Act which later stopped the flow of hot oil, the
crude oil price of a dollar per barrel, an increase in consumptive demand
and the general improvement of business conditions.168
Other offers of proof were made by defendants to show knowledge
of and acquiescence in the buying programs by federal o:fficials.169 The
purpose of these offers was not to establish immunity from prosecution
under the antitrust law-defendants admitted the authorization under
the N. I. R. A. necessary for such immunity had not been obtainedbut to show " 'the facts of the circumstances of the situations, which
must be taken into consideration' in order to judge the purpose, effect
and reasonableness of their activities." 110 Defendants maintained that
their activities were in line with "the keen desire of the Administration
... to stabilize the oil industry upon a profitable basis." 171
The jury was instructed that it was a violation of the Sherman Act
for a group of individuals to act together for the purpose of raising the
prices to be charged for a commodity where they control a substantial
part of the interstate trade and commerce in that commodity.112 It was
further charged that every person is presumed to intend the natural
and probable results of his acts knowingly done, and that an unlawful
act implies an unlawful intent.178 These two instructions meant the jury
should find defendants guilty if it believed that they controlled a substantial part of the trade in a commodity, and that the natural and
probable consequence of their buying programs was to raise prices.
The trial court refused defendants' request to grant instructions to the
168 Defendant oil companies sold gasoline in the Mid-Western area through their
own retail outlets and to jobbers. Both marketing channels were affected by the MidContinent spot market price. Retailers in this area followed the posted retail price of
Standard Oil Company of Indiana, and Standard's retail price was obtained by adding
freight charges, taxes, jobber and dealer margins to the prevailing Mid-Continent spot
market price. Sales to jobbers were by long-term contracts, the great majority of which
provided that the price should be the Mid-Continent spot market price on the date of
shipment. Fluctuations in the spot market price were reflected in the movement of the
price charged jobbers. But as pointed out previously, the indictment did not charge
defendants with concerted activity in either of these two marketi~g channels.
169 Brief for the Respondents 82-103, 179-197.
110 'Id. 181-182.
171 Statement by Secretary Ickes, September, 1933, quoted in id. 24.
172 Record, 2404-2405, 2407-2409, 241 I.
us Id. 2416.
-
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e:ffect that the purpose of the Sherman Act was not to make impossible
the normal conduct of interstate commerce through the adoption of
reasonable measures to protect such commerce from injurious and destructive practices, and that if the jury believed defendants' activities
were reasonable measures to protect interstate commerce from injurious
and destructive practices and thus to promote competition on a sound
basis, it must find defendants not guilty, even though an incidental
result therefrom was to contribute to the rise of the spot market and
retail prices for gasoline.174 The jury brought in a verdict of guilty
against defendants. The trial court's charge was held by the circuit
court of appeals to be reversible error because it was premised on the
theory that the buying program was illegal per se.175
Justice Douglas, on behalf of a majority of the seven justices participating in the decision, set aside the circuit court of appeals' judgment
and affirmed that of the trial court.176 From the language of the decision there are at least three rules of law which may be drawn in respect to the legality of co-operative action among competitors in so far
as such action is concerned with prices. In the first place, the decision may
mean that the charge of the trial court is a correct statement of the law.
Whether or not the trial court was correct in its charge to the jury was
the principal question presented for decision to the high court. If this is
the interpretation to ,be placed upon the Court's decision, the rule as
announced by the trial court may be stated as follows: Where competitors controlling a substantial part of the interstate or foreign commerce in a given commodity agree upon a course of action which has the
natural and probable effect of raising the price of the. commodity, the
Sherman Act is thereby violated without any further showing of unreasonableness. In other words, such course of conduct is per se illegal.
Another rule of law may be found in the portion of the Court's
decision which distinguishes the facts in cases cited by defendants from
those in the instant case. 177 The principal decision relied upon by defendants for sustaining the validity of their buying program was that
in the Appal,achian Coals case.178 Justice Douglas recognized the existence of "so-called demoralizing or injurious practices" in both that case
174'
175

Id. 2381.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 105 F. (2d)

809.
176 Justice Roberts, with whom Justice McReynolds concurred, dissented. The
Chief Justice andJustice Murphy did not participate in the decision of the case.
177 310 U.S. 150 at 214-217.
178 Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 53 S. Ct. 471 (1933).
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and the instant one. But the methods of dealing with them, he stated,
were divergent.
". .. . In the instant case there were buying programs of distress gasoline which had as their direct purpose and aim the raising
and maintenance of spot market prices and of prices to jobbers and
consumers in the Mid-Western area .... Unlike the plan in the
instant case, the plan in the Appalachian Coals case was not designed to operate vis-a-vis the general consuming market and to
fix the prices on that market. Furthermore, the effect, if any, of
that plan on prices was not only wholly incidental but also highly
conjectural. For the plan had not then been put into operation." 1'1 9

In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States 180 the Court upheld as a
reasonable restraint of trade a regulation by the defendant-appellant
board which prohibited its members from purchasing grain "to arrive"
during the period between the close of trading and the opening of the
session the following day at a price other than the closing bid. In discussing this case Justice Douglas said that since the regulation of the
board "was not aimed at price manipulation or the control of the market prices and since it had 'no appreciable effect on general market
prices,' the rule survived as a reasonable restraint of trade." 181 And
when referring to the rule of reason announced in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 182 he remarked that it had no application "to combinations operating directly on prices or price structures." 188
In these comments we find a repetition by the Court in the use of
the words "direct" and "market prices." The use of the word "direct"
is particularly significant, since in several of the cases cited by defendants, the Court had acknowledged that an incidental effect of the joint
action in question would be the raising and stabilization of prices. This
part of the decision, therefore, may be said to stand for the following
proposition: An agreement among competitors which has the direct
purpose of raising the market price of a given commodity in interstate
or foreign commerce is per se an unreasonable restraint of trade.
The third rule of law may be gleaned from the following quotations which are taken from a later part of the decision:
" ... So far as cause and effect are concerned it is sufficient in
this type of case if the buying programs of the combination resulted
in a price rise and market stability which but for them would not
have happened." m
179
180
181

182
310U.S.at216.
221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502 (1911).
188
246 U. S. 231, 38 S. Ct. 242 ( 1918).
310 U. S. l 50 at 214.
184
310 U.S. 150 at 217. ·
Id. at 219.
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". . . Any combination which tampers with price structures is
engaged in an unlawful activity. Even though the members of the
price-fixing group were in no position to control the market, to
'the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would
be directly interfering with the free play of market forces." 185
Summa~ing its "holding," the Court stated:
"Under the Sherman Act a combination.formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." 186
Inasmuch as. the Court stresses, in a lengthy footnote, that the establishment of a conspiracy under section I of the Sherman Act requires
only proof, of a purpose, and not also pr9of of power, to fix prices,181
we may delete from the 'last quoted paragraph the phrase, "and with
the effect." As thus revised, the third rule of law would read: A combination.formed for the purpose of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging,
or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is per se an unreasonable restraint of trade.
All three rules of law deducible from the decision preclude consideration of the reasonableness of co-operative action among competitors. But the standard defining the relationship between the cooperative
action and prices is different in each of the rules. The first rule is cast in
terms of "effect" upon prices. A condition to its applicability is
that the combining competitors control a substantial part of commerce
in a given commodity. This condition would logically mean that the
requisite effect must be upon "market" prices, since such prices are
affected, from the standpoint of the antitrust law, only through a combination of a substantial part of an industry. The second rule likewise
per,tains to. "market" prices but it is framed in terms of "purpose"-a
direct purpose-to raise the same. The third rule also is cast in terms
of "purpose" but it requires neither a "direct" purpose, nor an effect
upon "market" prices. If the Court eventually adopts the third rule
as the correct interpretation of section I of the Sherman Act, then it
185
186

Id. at 221.
Id. at 223.

181 Id. at 224, note 59. It was necessary for the government to prove that prices
in the Mid-Western area were actually raised as a result of the activities of the combination. Sales at the increased prices in that area had to be shown in order to establish.
jurisdiction in the Western Distri~t of Wisconsin, where the case was tried. The Court
treated the case, therefore, as one where exertion of tlie power to fix prices was an ingredient of the offense.
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will in effect have overruled the decision in the Appalachian Coals case.
It is not improbable that this will be the result reached by the present
Supreme Court.188
The Court held that the trial court had properly excluded defendants' offers of proof relating to knowledge of and acquiesence in the
buying programs by federal officials. Two reasons were given by
Justice Douglas for this holding. First, Congress had specified the
manner in which immunity from the antitrust law might be secured;
none other would suffice. "Though employees of the government may
have known of those programs and winked at them or tacitly approved
them, no immunity would have thereby been obtained." 189 It was
unnecessary for the Court to advance this justification for exclusion of
the evidence offered on the point of governmental acquiesence in the
buying programs, for, as noted previously, defendants made no claim
that such acquiesence granted immunity from the law. Secondly, and in
answer to the position taken by defendants, all price-fixing combinations are illegal per se. " ... they are not evaluated in terms of their
purpose, aim or effect in the elimination of so-called competitive evils.
Only in the event that they were, would such considerations have been
relevant." 190 Thus the doctrine as announced and developed in the
United States Steel and Fosburgh cases,101 that an "assurance" of reasonableness is imparted to those joint endeavors undertaken at the
request or with the acquiesence of public officials who lack authority for
their action, is expressly confined in its applicability to those activities
subject to the rule of reason. Only when co-operative action among
competitors is outside the range of activities determined by the Court
to be per se illegal will defendants be permitted to show the approval
or acquiesence of public officials as evidence of the reasonableness of the
restraint effected. And as the range of a~tivities ad.judged by the Court
to fall within the per se illegal class increases, the aforementioned doctrine will accordingly decrease in significance.
188 The Court in the instant case displayed little patience with "the age-old cry
of ruinous competition and competitive evils • . • [as] a defense to price-fixing conspiracies." 310 U. S. at 221. In defining price fixing, the Court said: "Hence, prices
are fixed within the meaning of the Trenton Potteries case if the range within which
purchases or sales will be made is agreed upon, if the prices paid or charged are to be
at a certain level or on ascending or descending scales, if they are to be uniform, or if
by various formulae they are related to the market prices. They are fixed because they
are agreed upon." Id. 222.
189 310 U. S. I 50 at 226.
190 Id at 228.
191 Discussed supra, Pa~t I, 40 MrcH. ~- REV. 969 at 985, 991.
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The N. I. R. A. period marks the first time in the history of antitrust law when the Congress abandoned the concept of a vigorous competitive system as the foundation for the full development of the productive and distributive facilities of the nation. Prior to this period,
there had been legislation which carved from the ban of the law certain
limited segments of private enterprise, such as the activities of export
trade associations 192 and the processing, handling and marketing of
farm and dairy products. 193 But with the enactment of the N. I. R. A.
came a shift from competition to co-operation that had its effect
throughout the entire economy. The brief examination which has been
made of practices under codes of fair competition serves to emphasize
the extent of the departure from the competitive ideal. The repercussions of this period have been many, not the least among which is the
decision in the Madison Oil case. Although the decision is subject to
conflicting interpretations, it is crystal clear in its teaching that joint
activities in line with the announced policy of an administration may
at a later date, with a change in policy, be found to be illegal.

III
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT DURING THE PRESENT EMERGENCY

An understanding of the enforcement policy now currently in effect
will be aided by a brief examination of the statements and activities of
the Antitrust Division since 1937, which. year marked the beginning of
the- Roosevelt administration's vigorous enforcement of the antitrust
law.
A. Antitn.tst from I937 to I94I
Approximately two years after the Supreme Court's decision in the
Schechter case,194 the administration turned its efforts toward an enforcement of the antitrust law. 195 The Annual Report for 1937,of the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division laid
down a statement of policy, made necessary, it was said, because "the
192 W ebb-Pomerene Export Trade Act, 40 Stat. L. 5 I 6 ( I 91 8), I 5 U. S. C.
(1940), § 61 et seq.
193 Capper-Volstead Act, 42 Stat. L. 388 (1922), 7 U.S. C. (1940), § 291 et
seq.
194 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct.
837 (1935).
195 For accounts of the divergent views held by members of the Administration
toward the monopoly problem, see Millis, "Cross Purposes in the New Deal," 14 VA.
Q. REv. 357 (1938); "What Do They Mean: Monopoly?" 17 FoRTUNE, No. 3, p.
75 (March, 1938),
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law is so vague that as a practical matter a wide discretion in enforcement must be exercised by the division." 196 • Statistics were quoted
showing the concentration of wealth and income in the hands of a few
large corporate enterprises. "Competition has of course declined" as a
result of such concentration, the report commented. Further evidence
of the disappearance of competition, the Assistant Attorney General
asserted, was to be found in the numerous identical bids received by
government agencies. The report then attacked the judicial interpretation of the antitrust law which looked at the "'intent' or 'state of
mind' of a fictitious corporate individual" in adjudging the lawfulness
of large aggregations of capital, rather than the "results" achieved
thereunder. "The antitrust laws have become theological tracts on corporate morality." Although the antitrust law has failed in its broad
purpose, the report continued, this does not mean that it has lost all
of its usefulness. It may still be employed against unfair methods of
competition and restraints of trade, and "there is hope that the courts
will return to enforcement of the statute against such acknowledged
monopolies as, for example, exists in aluminum." 197 The policy of the
Antitrust Division, therefore, and in view of its limited personnel, will
be to select for "intensive investigations" the complaints showing
flagrant violation of the law and in which the greatest public interest is
involved.
·
In the succeeding years this policy has been broadened as increased
appropriations for antitrust enforcement 198 have made possible a larger
personnel in the division and the institution of an unequalled number
of cases. Concentration upon a few selected cases has been superseded
by an effort to investigate all the alleged restraints affecting the distribution of a given product. An example of the application of this
practice may be found in the building industry, where the division
has investigated and indicted suppliers and distributors of building
products, and contractors and labor unions installing the same. Relief
from only one of the alleged restraints would not result in any appreciable lessening in the final price of the finished product; but by attacking
"on a Nation-wide scale, and simultaneously, all the various combinaws 1937 REP. ATTY. GEN. 35. Other quotations are from pages 37 and 39.
197 Id. 41. It is interesting to note that the court before whom the Aluminum case
was tried did not "acknowledge" the existence of a monopoly in that industry. United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (D. C. N. Y. 1941) unreported as of date of
writing. See C. C. H., TRADE REGULATION SERVICE, 9th ed.,
51,055, 52,715,
52,763.
198 See Part I, -4-0 MtcH. L. REv. 969 at 970, note 5·
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tions which are creating the log jams" it is believed that the .price to the
ultimate user would be substantially lowered. 199
The Department of Justice has adopted the policy of !publishing
"explanatory statements" in connection with the steps taken by the
Antitrust Division in its administration· of the law. 200 The purposes of
the "Public Statements" are fourfold: to furnish a guide to businessmen
who seek information on the probable action of the Department of
Justice in similar circumstances; to aid the department in formulating
a consistent enforcement policy; to warn those engaged in "similar
illegal practices"; and to call attention of the Congress to the interpretatic;m and application of the antitrust law by the Attorney General.
The statements are to cover the conditions which· the department believes to exist that create monopolistic control or restraint of trade in
a given industry, the reason why the particular legal procedure was
followed by the department, and the economic results which can be
expected from the department's action.
Although not designed for the purpose of discussing "the guilt or
innocence of particular defendants," the widespread and promine11t
publication of the statements has undoubtedly had the effect of unfairly prejudicing defendimts' position in so far as the public is concerned. In many instances the government press releases accompany the
return of an indictment or the filing of a complaint. As summarized in
· newspaper articles the statements, unfortunately,· may leave the impression with lay readers that defendants have been found guilty of
violating the antitrust law. That the views of the government as set
forth in its press releases are only those of a prosecutor in a pending
case is'not always fully appreciated by the reader. (The suggestion has
also been made that a resulting prej_udice may be found in the effect
of t,!ie statements upon the minds of the petit jurors in a criminal
action.201 ) Defendants have attempted in some cases to counteract the
impression left with the public by issuing explanatory statements on
their own behalf.202 A final judicial decision concerning the lawfulness
199 1939 REP. Arn. GEN. 40; 1938 id. 64; ARNOLD, BOTTLENECKS OF BusiNESS 36 et seq. (1940).
200 1938 REP. Arn. GEN. 60 and Appendix, 305.
201 Birnbaum, "The Auto-Finance Consent Decree: A New Technique in Enforcing the Sherman Act," 24 WASH. DNiv. L. Q. 525 at 529 (1939).
202 Statements by defendants have taken the form either of press releases or special brochures. An example of the latter is THE AMERICAN ToBACCo CoMPANY' AND
hs SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC ( 1940), published by the American Tobacco Company.
After a consent decree was entered in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
(D. C. N. Y. 1940) 3 C. C.H., TRADE REGULATION SERVICE, 8th ed., 1f 25,487 (not
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of defendants' activities must come to many readers as an anticlimax
after numerous statements, denials and explanations have been set
forth in the newspapers.
Reference has already been made to the number of antitrust actions
brought by the government in the second Roosevelt administration.
Of the one hundred and fifty-three equity and criminal proceedings instituted,208 a substantial proportion have been settled by consent decrees.
The use of the consent decree as a means for effectuating the enforcement of the antitrust law is not new,20¼ approximately one hundred and
fifteen decrees having been entered upon consent of the parties prior
to 1937.205 The special prominence accorded consent decrees during this
period is attributable to the large number entered and to the procedure
by which they have been employed.
In the second Roosevelt administration a total of thirty-three consent decrees were entered.206 This sum represents more than one-fourth
the number entered during the prior forty-six years. All but three of
the decrees were entered in the last thirteen months of the administration.
The concurrent use of civil and criminal remedies by the Antitrust
Division has given rise to much comment from private sources---and,
in one instance, has evoked the official displeasure of a United States
District Court judge.201 This procedure has occurred in substantially the
officially reported), a booklet entitled BAUSCH & LoMB AND OuR NATIONAL DEFENSE
(1940) was published by defendant company to answer the "untruthful and inflammatory attacks on Bausch & Lomb's patriotism."
208 See Part I, 40 MICH. L. REv. 969 at EJ73, note IO.
2 oi A study of consent decrees entered in antitrust cases prior to 1933 may be
found in Donovan and McAllister, "Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal
Anti-Trust Laws," 46 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1933).
•
205 See TEMPORARY NATIONAL EcoNoMrc CoMMI'ITEE MoNOGRAPH No. 16,
"Antitrust in Action," Appendix D, pp. 126-128 (1941).
206 Antitrust consent decrees for this period may be found in 3 C. C. H.,
TRADE REGULATION SERVICE, 8th ed. The following articles discuss several of the important consent decrees entered during this period. Birnbaum, "The Auto-Finance
Consent Decree: A New Technique in Enforcing the Sherman Act," 24 WASH. UNiv.
L. Q. 525 (1939); Isenberg and Rubin. "Antitrust Enforcement Through Consent
Decrees," 53 HARV. L. REv. 386 (1940): Katz, "The Consent Decree in Antitrust
Administration," 53 HARV. L. REv. 415 (1940); Whitman, "The Consent J?ecree in
the Moving Picture Industry," IO FoRDHAM L. REv. 65 (1941).
207 After learning that negotiations between the government and defendants in the
automobile finance cases [United States v. Ford Motor Co. and United States v. Chrysler Corp., THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, Supplement, Nos. 430, 431 (1941)]
were taking place at the same time that evidence was being presented to a grand jury
on an alleged violation of the law by the automobile companies, District Judge Geiger
discharged the grand jury with the statement: "I do not think it was proper for these
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following manner. While evidence was being presented to a grand
jury regarding alleged violations of the antitrust law, or after the return of an indictment, negotiations would be under way between the
government and defendants for the purpose of reaching a settlement
through the entry of a consent decree. If the provisions of a proposed
decree were acceptable to the parties, the government' would agree to
file a complaint in equity framed in terms of the subject matter covered
by the decree, and would further agree to recommend to the court an
acceptance of its nolo prosse. In recent negotiations the government has
insisted that defendants file pleas of nolo contendere and pay fines in
the criminal case.
The view has been expressed that by such a procedure the club of
criminal proceedings is used to coerce defendants into an agreement
containing provisions conformable to the economic philosophy of government officials, irrespective of the legal boundaries marked out by
the law and the cases decided thereunder. The Antitrust Division has
acknowledged that a consent decree will be accepted only if it offers
"substantial public benefits connected with the policy of maintaining
free competition in an orderly market which could not be obtained by
the criminal prosecution." 208 What constitutes "public benefits" is, of
course, subject to widely varying interpretations. Although defendants
are free at any time to withdraw from the negotiations and defend the
criminal case, the time and expense involved in a major antitrust suit
are so substantial that capitulation to certain "public benefits" provisions
demanded by the government may appear to be the less undesirable
course to follow. Tlie claim is made, therefore, that the criminal action
fetters defendant's free choice in negotiating for a consent decree. 209

a

parties to get together during the session of this grand jury and negotiate a deal here
in a matter that would be comprehended within the terms of a probable indictment."
HEARING BEFORE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, WITH REGARD TO THE
OFFICIAL CONDUCT OF JUDGE FERDINAND A. GEIGER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF W1scoNSIN, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938), p. I Ir.
208 1938 REP. ATTY. GEN., Appendix, p. 307, and cf. p. 66.
209 At this point we may note that an attempt by several defendants in United
States v. Hartford-Empire Co., (D. C. Ohio, 1940) r F. R. D. 424, 3 C. C. H.,
TRADE REGULATION SERVICE, 8th ed., 1f 25,548, to force the government to "agree"
to a proposed consent decree was unsuccessful. Defendants presented to the court a
decree -which apparently provided for the discontinuance of the specific practices complained of by the government. The court pointed out that the prayer for relief in
the petition had the usual clause asking for "such other further general and different
relief as the nature of the case may require, and the court may deem proper in the
premises." The court said it could not, prior to testimony in the case, determine that
the proposed decree would satisfy everything requested in the prayer. The court further stated: "A consent decree •.• is an agreement between the contending parties in
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As an answer to this contention 210 the government has announced
"the precise limitations which the Department imposes upon itself in
using civil and criminal procedure concurrently." These are as follows.
First, the department will in no instance start negotiations on the basis
of which prosecution would be dropped. Secondly, it will not compromise criminal cases on the mere promise to reform. Thirdly, it will submit all proposals to a judicial tribunal and be guided by the judgment
of the court before it takes final action. 211 Fourthly, a public statement
will be issued giving the reasons for the government's action.212
A determination whether the claim which has been advanced against
the concurrent use of civil and criminal remedies in antitrust enforcement is justified or not would require a knowledge of what transpired
in the negotiations for the numerous consent decrees. It would require
an appraisal of the attitude of the officials conducting the discussions on
behalf of the government. It would have to take into account the overzealousness of particular officials in particular instances. It would have
to consider the e:ffect of overreaching on the part of the government in
past cases upon the judgment by defendants _of proposals advanced by
the case, such agreement meeting with the approval of the court. That, of course,
cannot be appealed from. Since the Government has not and will not consent to these
decrees, they cannot properly be termed consent decrees, and the court cannot force a
consent decree upon one of the parties. That, indeed, would be an anomalous situation."
210 The government has commented upon the contention in these words:
"Of course, any criminal prosecution could be used as an instrument of coercion.
There is no absolute guarantee against such practices except good faith in the prosecuting officer. On the other hand, it is equally true that charges of coercion are easier to
make against those who prosecute violations of the antitrust laws than in most types
of prosecution. The evidence taken in a grand jury investigation cannot be disclosed.
And even when the evidence is disclosed in a trial, it is usually too complicated to be
understood without laborious analysis. There is, therefore, no protection which the
Department can have against such public charges of coercion. Commentators are free
to give vent to their emotional impulses without fear of successful correction." 1938
REP. ATTY. GEN. 65.
In this connection we may note that three remedies for the enforcement of the
Sherman Act are available to the government: the libel action (§ 6), the criminal action
(§§ 1, 2 and 3) and the suit in equity(§ 4). 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S. C.
( 1940), § I et seq. There is no indication from the terms of the act that the three
remedies may not be brought concurrently. In Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 226 U.S. 20 at 52, 33 S. Ct. 9 (1913), the Court stated: "The Sherman Act
provides for a criminal proceeding to punish violations and suits in equity to restrain
such violations, and the suits 1may be brought simultaneously or successively. The order
of their bringing must depend upon the Government. . • ."
211 Court approval of a proposed decree is usually a perfunctory matter, the decree
being signed by the court the same day it is presented by the government. To date no
court has refused to sign such a decree.
212 1938 REP. ATTY. GEN. 65-66.
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other ~:fficials in subsequent cases. Obviously, such a determination can
never fully be made. It is enough for our purposes to be acquainted
with the claim, and to note that it is responsible, whether justly or
unjustly asserted, for much of the special prominence accorded to consent decrees during this period.

B. Enforcement Policy During World War II
While the United States approached and finally became involved
in the most serious national emergency the country has experienced, the
Antitrust Divisiori was functioning at a record pace in the number of
proceedings instituted under the law. The belief was held in some
qu~ers that with the nation formally at war, the government's antitrust activities would be halted or at least considerably slowed down.
But the division quickly turned its full energy toward ends believed
by it to be consonant with the nation's all-out war production program.
A complete utilization of existing and potential productive facilities and
skills has become impossible, the division asserts, because of private
agreements restraining trade. Assistant Attorney General Arnold
charges:
"L9oking back over Io months of defense e:ffort we can now
~ee how much it has been hampered by the attitude-of powerful
private groups dominating basic industries who have feared to
expand their production because expansion would endanger their
future control of industry. These groups have been afraid to develop new production themselves. They have been afraid to let
others come into the field. They have concealed shortages by optimistic predictions of supplies, and talked of production facilities
which do not exist.
"Antitrust investigations during the past year have shown that
there is not an organized basic industry in the United States which
has not been restricting production by some device or other in order
to avoid what they call 'the ruinous over-production after the
war.'" 213
By declaring that "the true function of an antimonopoly policy is
to break down the obstacles to production created by dominant
groups," 214 the Antitrust Division is able to justify the continuation of
its vigorous enforcement policy during the present emergency. Current
restraints of trade are visualized by the division as existing in the fol1941 id. 58.
Hid. 60.

213
2

1942]

ANTITRUST DURING EMERGENCIES

lowing eight categories: concerted attempts on the part of basic industries to hamper expansion which will· interfere with their domination
after the war; attempts to fix coercively prices on government contracts; 215 attempts to use patents illegally in order to control the production of basic materials; restraints in the distribution of the necessities
of life by local groups; erection of trade barriers between one locality
and another; the freezing out of independent businessmen by combinations which seek to dominate the market; the refusal of labor monopolies
to remove illegal restrictions which now interfere with. full production;
and the use of price ceilings and other war agency rulings as a cloak
for new restraints of trade. 216
Thus far during the present emergency two features in the program
of the Antitrust Division are of special significance, namely, the efforts
to prevent discrimination against small business units in the establishment of priorities and the letting of government contracts, and the entry
of consent decrees affecting alleged international cartel arrangements.
In the fall of I 941 a S.t,nall Business Section was set up in the Antitrust Division. The functions of the section are to assist small business
enterprises on problems arising under the antitrust law and in their
dealings with government war agencies. 211 The section has been active
in its representation of small business enterprises before war agencies
and it has, among other things, intervened in certain instances prior
to the award of contracts to urge a revision of specifications so as to en215 In an indictment returned Nov. 28, 1941, United States v. Empire Hat &
Cap Manufacturing Co., (D. C. Pa.), it is alleged that defendants agreed among themselves to fix arbitrary and noncompetitive prices which defendant manufacturers should
bid in response to an Army Request for Informal Bids, and to allocate the quantity
of hats included in said request among defendant manufacturers and others so that each
would bid upon an arbitrary number of such hats.
A War Frauds Unit was established in the Department of Justice in February,
1942. Among other duties the unit will be in charge of prosecutions of alleged conspiracies to increase the cost of plants and factories built to manufacture war materials.
See Department of Justice release, May 16, 1942.
216 1941 REP. ATTY. GEN. 60; HEARINGS BEFORE SuBcoMMITrEE OF HousE
CoMMITrEE ON APPROPRIATIONS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATION
BILL FOR 1943, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), p. 198 et seq. See also ARNOLD, DEMOCRACY AND FREE ENTERPRISE (1942); Arnold and Livingston, "Antitrust War Policy
and Full Production," 20 HARV. Bus. REv. 265 (1942).
217 HEARI'NGS BEFORE SELECT HousE CoMMITrEE To CoNDUCT A STUDY AND
SURVEY OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM IN ITS REZ:ATION TO SMALL BUSINESS
OF THE UNITED STATES, PURSUANT TOH. RES. 294, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942) p.
173 et seq. (unrevised print). Arnold defined small business "as any business which
does not have an office in Washington to represent them before these committees." Id.
176.
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abie the small business company to receive a share in the award. 218 The
Antitrust Division views its assistance in these matters as in line with its
traditional function.

i ~·• « ... in a very real sense [it] has always been a small business
\ section ... our forum prior to this war consisted of the courts ...
when the war came on it became apparent that the decisions, the
court policy-making decisions on which the small businessman's
life depends, are going to be made, to a large extent, by defense
agencies.... Our function is to represent specific cases of hardship
in the application of that policy and to represent them before the
boards which make the policy." 219
Within recent months the existence of international cartels has been
brought to the attention of the public by the entry of several consent
decrees and by testimony of government officials before Senate committees concerning their alleged effect upon domestic production:220 As a
result of the current indiscriminate use of the word "cartel," 221 it is not
unlikely that one result of the present war enforcement policy will be
the substitution in the lay vernacular of "cartel" for "monopoly" as a
term connoting a conglomeration of industrial evils.
The consent decree which was entered in United States v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co.222 was the earliest of such decrees. The government charged that a combination among defendants to restrain interstate and foreign commerce in military optical instruments was effected
21a1d. 174-175.
2191d. 176.
220 See HEARINGS .BEFORE SPECIAL SENATE CoMMI'ITEE INVESTIGATING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM, 77th Cong., 2d sess., Mar. 26, 27, 1942, Bureau of
National Affairs transcript 3358-34II; HEARINGS BEFORE SENATE PATENT CoMMI'ITEE ON S. BILL 2303, 77th Cong., 2d sess., April 13, 1942, current.
221 Arnold has defined a cartel to mean a "combination of a number of companies
and individuals to keep business within that particular little ring, and to eliminate all
competition which isn't dominated or controlled by them.
''The cartel system is an economic disease which attacks communities when
people think they have got a mature economy and they want to make themselves secure
and don't want to be bothered by fighting a lot of other people who are producing
what they call 'distress' production, or ruinous competition. • ••
"The disease of cartelization does not stop with industry. It is responsible for
most of the practices for which we now condemn labor for forcing on employers." 12
U. S. NEws, No. 16, pp. 16 and 18, April 17, 1942.
A cartel is defined by SEAGER and GuucK, TRUST AND CORPORATION PROBLEMS 5 (1929), as a "combination which disposes of the agreed aggregate outputs of
all the members through a common selling agent or company in which each has a proportionate interest."
222 (D; C: N. Y. 1940) 3 C. C. H., TRADE REGULATION SERVICE, 8th ed., 1f
25,487 (not officially reported).
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by agreements which, among other things, prevented Bausch & Lomb
from selling outside the United States without the prior consent of the
German Carl Zeiss corporation, and prevented the latter from selling in
. the United States without the like consent of Bausch & Lomb. Inventions resulting from the joint labor of the two companies were to be
patented in the United States by Bausch & Lomb for the account of
Carl Zeiss. The decree declared that the agreements were unlawful
and enjoined Bausch & Lomb from carrying out any of their provisions. It was expressly provided, however, that the rights of Bausch
& Lomb under any patents for the manufacture of military optical
instruments were not affected by the provisions of the decree. This
would mean that the sole ownership of those patents obtained by the
American company for the account of Carl Zeiss was thereby vested in
the American company. The consent decree in United States v. Allied
Chemical & Dye Corp. 223 enjoined alleged cartel activities and restrictions by prohibiting the defendants from combining among themselves or with others to control imports or exports from the United
States, or the prices, terms, or conditions of sale of fertilizer nitrogen.
Consent decrees in United States v. Standard Oil Company
(N. J.), 224 and United States v. Aluminum Company of America 225
have been directed at alleged restraints in domestic production of synthetic rubber and magnesium, respectively, resulting from agreements
between the American companies and the German I. G. Farbenindustrie. These two decrees are especially noteworthy inasmuch as they
afford a measure of relief from alleged misuse of patent rights beyond
any previously acceded to by defendants. 226 In the Bausch & Lomb
223 (D. C. N. Y. 1941) 42 F. Supp. 425, C. C. H., TRADE REGULATION
SERVICE, 9th ed., 1f 52,606 (not officially reported). See also United States v. Alba
Pharmaceutical Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1941) id. 1f 52,650 (not officially reported); United
States v. Bayer Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1941) id. 1f 52,651 (not officially reported).
224 (D. C. N. ]. 1942) id. 1f 52,768 (not officially reported).
225 (D. C. N. Y. 1942) id., 1f 52,776 (not officially reported).
226 One exception to this generalization may be found in the consent decree entered in United States v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., (D. C. Ill. 1941) id., 1f 52,644
(not officially reported). It provides in part: "The defendants ... are hereby ordered
to divest themselves of all right, title and interest in and to said United States Patent
1,794,361, and forthwith to take such steps as may be necessary to dedicate, transfer,
and assign said Letters Patent and all rights thereunder to the public (including said
defendants),._ without the payment of royalties or other compensation whatever therefor."
Forfeiture of a patent to the public domain for misuse thereof is beyond any
relief the government is now entitled to. (See recommendation of the T. N. E. C.
concerning forfeiture of patents, Part I, 40 M1cH. L. REv. 969 at 971, note 6, supra.)
The writer has been informed by counsel for one of the defendants that although they
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case .we noted that all rights of defendant in its patents were expressly
reserved by the terms of the decree. By the .terms of the Standard Oil
Company and Aluminum Company decrees the defendants agree to
grant unrestricted licenses under the allegedly misused patents to any
applicant royalty free for the duration of the present emergency and
thereafter at a reasonable royalty rate. In the case of patents relating
to the fabrication of magnesium, as disti.nguished from production
patents, the license is to be royalty free for the life of the patents. The
divergent treatment of defendant's patent rights in the early Bausch &
Lomb decree and the recent Standard Oil Company and A'luminum
Company decrees is due to two decisions handed down by the Supreme
Court in January, 1942. The Court held that where the patent privilege had been unlawfully exercised by the holder thereof ( a license
granted on condition that the patented invention be used by licensee
only with unpatented materials furnished by licensor 221 ) a suit for infringement shall be dismissed for want of equity "until it is made to
appear that the improper practice has been abandoned and that the consequences of the misuse of the patent have been dissipated." 228 The
Antitrust Division now argues, and imposes as a condition to its acceptance of consent decrees in settlement of cases involving an alleged
misuse of patents, that the consequences of the misuse cannot be fully
dissipated unless the patented invention is opened up to all applicants
free of any restrictions. 229 By reason of the alleged unlawful patent
were willing to open up licensing under the patent during the war emergency, in view
of the circumstance that the patent expires in a few years, they decided it was preferable to transfer their right, title and interest therein to the public at the present time.
The decree does not, therefore, represent an instance of overreaching by the government, nor does it stand as a guide to conditions imposed by the government for its
acceptance of a consent decree involving an alleged misuse of patents.
227 See Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283
U.S. 27, 51 S. Ct. 334 (1931); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 58
S. Ct. 288 (1938).
228 Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., (U. S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 402 at 405;
B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, (U. S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 406.
229 As the law now stands, a patent owner is under no obligation to manufacture
the patented article or to grant licenses for the manufacture, use, or sale of the same.
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 28 S. Ct. 748
(1908). He can fix any terms of royalty he chooses, Standard Oil Cq. v. United States,
283 U.S. 163, 51 S. Ct. 421 (1931); he can fix the price at which the patented article
may be sold by his licensee, United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476, 47
S. Ct. l 92 ( l 926) ; he can fix the quantity or the percentage of the whole output to
be manufactured by the licensee, Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works
Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1907) 154 F. 358; he can grant licenses limited to a particular
field or fields of use, General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304
U. S. 175, 58 S. Ct. 849 (193&). But where-patentees cross-license each other the
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practices in the past, certain business relationships have been estabiishe4
and potential competition has been kept out of the market. These relationships can be broken down and new competition made possible, the
division asserts, only by compulsory, unrestrictedlicensing.230 The presence or absence of provisions in future decrees relating to payment of
reasonable royalties for the grant of unrestricted licenses will probably
depend upon the strength of defendant's bargaining position.

C. Postponement of Antitrust Cases
Among recent antitrust investigations and prosecutions have been
many that are directed against corporations and officers thereof now
devoting a substantial part of their productive facilities and skills to the
manufacture of war materials. Such investigations and prosecutions have
interfered, to some extent, with the affected individuals' time and concentration of mind on the vital needs of a nation at war. Of serious consequence is the time taken by corporate officials in the legitimate preparation of a defense to the charges made against them. Such consumption
of time begins when the grand jury subpoena duces tecum is served on
the company and ends only after the jury verdict has been announced.
Between these dates are days spent in testifying before a grand jury, in
conferences with counsel respecting an explanation of hundreds of letters and contracts, and in testifying as a witness at the trial of the case.
One of the first measures taken by the government to accommodate
antitrust enforcement to present emergency conditions was an informal
announcement by the head of the Antitrust Division that any prosecution would be stopped upon receipt of a letter from a government
agency stating the reasons why it believed a given case interfered with
national defense. 281 While this policy was in effect no cases were postponed by reason of a claimed interference with the time of corporate
executives.
Court has said: "Unless the industry is dominated, or interstate commerce directly
restrained, the Sherman Act does not require cross-licensing patentees to license at
reasonable rates others engaged in interstate commerce." Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, supra, 283 U. S. at 172.
280 See statement and testimony of Thurman Arnold before Senate Committee on
Patents, April 23, 1942, HEARINGS ON S. BILL 2303, 77th Cong., 2d sess.
281 At the HEARINGS BEFORE THE SELECT HousE CoMMIT.TEE TO CONDUCT A
STUDY AND SURVEY OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM IN ITS RELATION TO SMALL
Bus1NEss OF THE UNITED STATES, PURSUANT To H. RES. 294, 77th Cong., 2d sess.
(1942), p. 184 (unrevised print), Arnold stated: "I am willing to stop any prosecution
if any responsible Government agency will give me reasons in writing why it interferes
with national defense, and if they will take that responsibility; I do not care to be the
sole judge."

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

In an exchange of letters between the President, the Attorney Gen· eral, and the Secretaries of War and the Navy, released on March 28,
I 942, a formal procedure was established for determining whether
postponement of investigations, suits and prosecutions under the antitrust law would be in the national interest.232 Each pending and future
investigation, prosecution or suit is to be examined by the Attorney
General and the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, respectively. Upon their agreement that the pending or future action
will not seriously interfere with the all-out prosecution of the war, the
Attorney General will proceed. If they agree that it will interfere
("it must be preponderantly clear that the progress of the war effort
is being impeded"), or if after djsagreement between them, then upon
receipt of a letter from either Secretary stating that in his opinion the
investigation, prosecution or suit will seriously interfere with the war
effort, the Attorney General will defer his activity in the particular
matter. In case of such disagreement, however, the Attorney General
reserves the right to lay all the facts before the President, whose determination shall be final. 233
The procedure thus established would appear to be well adapted
to resolving the problem raised. By providing that the Attorney General will accede to a postponement request issued by either of the Secretaries, following a disagreement between the Attorney General and
a Secretary, it is recognized that those better qualified to appraise the
actual extent of an interference with the war effort occasioned by antitrust investigations or proceedings ~re to make the final decision in the
matter, subject to an ultimate Presidential determination if the Attorney General desires the same. It would further appear that the procedure will prevent misuse of the postponement privilege by defendants since ,postponement will be granted only after it-is "preponderantly clear" that the war effort would be impeded by antitrust investigations or proceedings.
232 Biddle, Stimson, Knox and Arnold to Roosevelt, Mar. 20, 1942; Roosevelt to
Biddle, Stimson and Knox, Mar. 20, 1942. N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1942, § I> p. 1,
col. 4.
233 The letters also state that the Congress shall be requested to pass an act extending the statute of limitations; and that "under no circumstances will there be any suspension or postponement of prosecution for any actual fraud committed against the
Government."
As of date of writing, the Attorney General has agreed to apply for adjournment
in one case, pursuant to the formal procedure for postponement. United States v. General Electric Company (tungsten carbide case), Department of Justice Release, April 25,
1942; N. Y. TIMES, April 26, 1942, § 1, p. 25, col. 4.
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Suspension by the Department of Justice in I 940 of part of its
proposed equity suit against twenty-two major oil companies was due
to the probable effect of the relief sought upon the defense program.
As originally drafted the bill in equity sought, among other things, to
divest the comp·anies of certain types of properties, such as pipe lines
and tankers, and to divorce transportation and marketing from the
production of oil.m The draft complaint was submitted to the National
Defense Advisory Commission for its consideration of the effect of such
relief upon national defense. Upon receipt from the commission of a
report indicating that a number of serious defense problems would be
raised by a court decree of divestiture,285 the Attorney General redrafted
the complaint, limiting its scope to charges against price fixing, discrimination, and similar practices which tend to restrain the independent
oil companies and jeopardize the interest of consumers.286 The Attorney General's action in this instance is comparable to that taken during
World War I when the government secured a postponement of argument in, and final decision by, the Supreme Court in several of its major
equity suits which sought dissolutions of defendant corporations.287
Postponement of cases because of the relief sought will not be frequent
during the present emergency for the reason that few suits are now
pending where the granting of the government's prayer would result in
a disorganization of corporate structures.

D. Co-operative Action on Behalf of the War Effort
The current apprehension on the part of business managers concerning the legality of co-operative action with government agencies
in line with the war effort is traceable to several causes. In the first
place, the enforcement policy of the government since 1937, among
other things, has made corporate officials wary of any co-operative
endeavors. This caution is also attributable to the widespread publicity
accompanying the comprehensive investigation of business practices
conducted by the Temporary National Economic Committee, a study
suggested by the President and participated in fully by the Antitrust
3 C. C.H., TRADE REGULATION SERVICE; 8th ed., U15,097.
Id., U 15,101. The commission reported that divestiture of facilities used in
marketing petroleum products "may affect the construction of such facilities pursuant to
negotiations now under way or in prospect for national defense purposes," and that
divestiture of transportation facilities might increase the difficulty of obtaining supplies
and intensify the problem of financing additional crude oil pipe line construction.
288 Petition filed Sept. 30, ,:940, United States v. American Petroleum Institute,
id., U 17,039.
287 See Part I, 40 MICH, L. REv. 969 at 997.
28 ¾ See
285
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Division and the Federal Trade Commission.288 A second cause for
the present apprehension is found in the strict attitude of the Supreme
Court toward joint or uniform action by competitors. We have noted
the decision of the Court in the Madison Oil case, and the ruling
announced therein on defendants' o:ffers of proof which related to
knowledge of and acquiescence in the buying programs by governmel).t
officials. Further evidence of this attitude is found in the decision of
the Court in Interstate Circuit v. United States.239 There the Court
stated:
"· .. It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was
contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to
the scheme and participated in it. Each distributor was advised
that the others were asked to participate; each knew that cooperation was essential to successful operation of the plan. . .. Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation
to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if
carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to
establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act." 240
Recognizing the reluctance of businessmen to engage in certain necessary co-operative or uniform action under the war program by reason
See Part I, 40 M1cH. L. REv. 969 at 971, note 6.
306 U. S. 208, 59 S. Ct. 467 (1939).
240 Id., 306 U. S. at 226, 227. In this case an exhibitor of motion picture films had
written letters to eight branch managers of distributor companies, each letter naming
all of them as addressees, asking compliance with two demands as a condition of his
continued exhibition of distributors' films in first-run theatres at top admission prices.
By the demands distributors were to agree with him that their "A" product would not
be exhibited in subsequent-run theatres at less than a stipulated minimum price and
would not be exhibited in such theatres as part of a double-feature program. These
restrictions were imposed by distributors upon some of the subsequent-run theatres.
The trial court found not -only that separate agreements had been entered into between
each of the distributors and the exhibitor, which agreements were without the protection afforded by the Copyright Act, but also that the distributors had agreed and
conspired _among themselves to impose the demanded restrictions upon subsequent-run
theatres. The latter :finding was based upon an inference drawn by the court from the
manner in which the proposals were made, from the substantial unanimity of action
taken upon them by distributors, and from the fact that distributors failed to call as
witnesses any of their superior officials who negotiated the contracts with the exhibitor
and who normally would have had knowledge of whether an agreement among the
distributors had existed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
judgment. (Justices Roberts, McReynolds and Butler dissented.) Speaking for the
majority, Justice Stone held that the evidence supported the inference of an agreement
among distributors. But in the circumstances of this case, he continued, such an agreement was not a prerequisite to an 1,1nlawful conspiracy. That part of the opinion which is
quoted in the text, above,'then follows.
238
239
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of these factors, the administration has taken some steps to obviate the
possibility of antitrust proceedings in the future based on such action.
The first of these occurred in the early part of April, 1941, when
the general counsel of the Office of Production Management ( now
the War Production Board) wrote to the Attorney General requesting
approval of a proposed procedure for the handling of industry meet-·
ings called to discuss problems common to an industry and looking to
future action in the interest of national defense. 241 The procedure contemplated the calling of industry meetings only by 0. P. M. At such
meetings a representative of the office would always be present, and
minutes thereof would be kept. Any subject pertinent to the problem
of defense might be discussed and suggestions from industry members
" as to the practical steps which should be taken to achieve the results
for defense which are desired" were to be secured. But no agreement
or understanding was to be reached at the meetings. All requests for
industry action were to be made by 0. P. M. after clearance of the same
with the Department of Justice. Approval of this procedure was given
by the Attorney General, who stated that the procedure, "if followed,
should serve to protect those who participate in the meetings against
charges that the meetings violate the antitrust laws." 242
Several questions were left unanswered by this procedure. In what
form would the requested action be stated, i.e., to individual units of
an industry or to the industry as a whole? Would the action taken pursuant to an official request be protected as well as the participation of
industry members in the meetings? Furthermore, what protection was
actually afforded by the words, "should serve to protect those who participate"? The Attorney General's announcement on April 29, 1941,
of the policy to be followed by the Department of Justice in applying
the antitrust law to activities under the national defense program served
as an answer to these questions.248
241 John Lord O'Brian to Attorney General Jackson, April 8, 1941. This and
other letters hereinafter referred to may be obtained from the appropriate government
agency.
242
Jackson to O'Brian, April 9, 1941.
248
The announcement was made in identical letters, dated April 29, 1941, sent
to O'Brian and Leon Henderson, Administrator, Office of Price Administration and
Civilian Supply ( now Office of Price Administration). The Attorney General stated that
the allocation of orders, curtailment of some kinds of production, and establishment of
priorities and price ceilings, if accomplished by private arrangement within an industry for private advantage would probably constitute violations of the antitrust law, but
"it is obvious that in the present emergency acts performed by industry under the
direction of public authority, and designed to promote public interest and not to achieve
private ends, do not constitute violations." The department recognized, however, that
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Pursuant to the terms of the announcement, an industry-through
its committee-may meet with representatives of the 0. P. M. or
0. P. A.244 Industry committees shall confine themselves to collecting
and analyzing information and making recommendations to the respective war agencies. They cannot determine policies for the industry
nor attempt to compel or coerce anyone to comply with any request or
order made by the agency. Before requests for action within a· given
field shall be made, the general character of the action must be cleared
with the Department of Justice. If the general plan is approved, thereafter each request for specific action in carrying out the plan shall be
made in writing and approved by the general counsel of the agency.
Requests for action on the part of any unit of an industry shall be made
to such unit by 0. P. M. or 0. P.A. and not by the industry committee. 245 The scope of the protection afforded industry under this procedure was defined by the Attorney General as follows:
"Acts done in compliance with the specific requests_ made hy
the Office of Production Management or the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply and approved by their General
Counsel in accordance with the procedure described in this letter
will not be viewed by the Department of Justice as constituting a
violation of the antitrust laws and no prosecutions will be instituted for acts performed in good faith and within the fair intendment of instructions given by the Office of Production Management
businessmen are entitled to the co-operation of government agencies in eliminating uncertainties under the law; accordingly, this policy was formulated.
244 Industrial committees to work on defense problems with representatives of the
government agency may be formed only at' the request of the agency. Whether such a
committee is needed, and if so, how it shall be chosen and by whom constituted are the
sole responsibilities of the agency. Industry, may, however, co-operate in the selection of
its representatives for such committees. " ... any such committee should be generally
representative of the entire industry and satisfactory to the government agency."
The selection of 0. P. M. Industry Advisory Committees 'Yas originally made
either by election participated in by all members of the industry or through nominations made by a large number of representatives of the industry. These methods proved
to be cumbersome, and, in many instances, it was necessary for 0. P. M. to add to the
nominations in order to make the committee properly representative. By 0. P. M.
· Regulation No. 12 and General Administrative Order No. 2-7, dated January 14 and
17, 1942 (approved generally in exchange of letters between O'Brian and Attorney
General Biddle, December 22 and 24, 1941) the selection of such committees was
placed entirely in the hands of 0. P. M. officials.
245 The Attorney General elaborated upon this point in the following words:
"That is to say, the function of determining what steps should be taken in the public
interest should in each case be exercised by the public authority which may seek the
individual or collective advice of the industry. But the determination shall not be
made by the industry itself or by its representatives."
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or the Office of Price Administration ~nd Civilian Supply pursuant
to this procedure.
"In the case of all plans or procedure, however, the Department reserves complete freedom to institute civil actions to enjoin
the continuing of acts or practices found not to be in the public
interest and persisted in after notice to desist." 240
It is to be noted that under this procedure a request for action does
not take the form of a proposed agreement among industrial units, but
rather is in the form of a request from a war agency directly to a particular industrial unit. Co-operation among members of an industry is
thereby confined to collecting and analyzing information and making
recommendations. Subsequent letters from the Attorney General,
however, have given approval to co-operative action among industrial
units in the execution of a plan deemed necessary by a war agency. In
reply to the assertion by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation that many of that agency's plans would require joint action
among carriers, the Attorney General wrote:
"While it is, of course, impossible to anticipate all plans involving the exercise of discretion by carriers which the Office of
Defense Transportation may desire to undertake in the future, you
may be assured that the policy stated in this letter [ as contained in
the April 29, 1941, announcement] does not preclude approval
by the Department of such plans in appropriate cases." 247
Plans by local business enterprises for pooling deliveries and curtailing
services as a means of conserving delivery equipment can be approved
by the Department of Justice.248 Approval has also been given to conferences which are held pursuant to the request of 0. P. M. for the
purpose of pooling facilities and experience in the fields of production
and distributiort in order that small manufacturers may jointly obtain
war contracts or subcontracts.249
Complete protection from future suits based on activities by indus246

Jackson to O'Brian and Henderson, April 29, 1941.
Eastman to Biddle, February 8, 1942; Biddle to Eastman, February 12, 1942.
248
See Joint Statement by Office of Defense Transportation and Department of
Justice Relative to Local Delivery Service by Motor Vehicle, Released Mar. 12, 1942.
249
O'Brian to Biddle, Sept. 30, 1941; Biddle to O'Brian, Oct. 4, 1941. The
Attorney General commented: "The legality of these preliminary conferences and
discussions depends largely upon the nature of the action which follows. For this
reason, the Department of Justice must necessarily reserve freedom of action •.• to
institute civil actions to enjoin the continuing of discussions and practices which have
been found not to be in the public interest and which have been persisted in after notice
to desist."
247
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trial units within the scope of the Attorney General's letters is not yet
assured. In connection with the "approval" by President Theodore
Roosevelt of the acquisition by the United States Steel Corporation of
the Tennessee Company stock,250 it was pointed out that the power
to adjudge the legality of activities under the antitrust law resides
solely in the )udicial branch of the government, and that any decision
by an Attorney General in respect to such activities relates only to the
exercise of his power, as prosecutor, to institute, or to refrain from
instituting, the available legal remedies. The present policy of the
Department of Justi\:e as set forth in the several letters is not, therefore, binding upon succeeding administrations. Undoubtedly, this
policy will be adopted by future administrations if for no other reason
than that it would be the honorable and equitable course to follow.
The slight possibility that it might not be adopted, and that criminal
actions might be brought against industrial units which, in good faith,
have followed the procedure outlined does warrant, nevertheless, a
measure affording full immunity from any antitrust proceeding. The
harassment caused by such proceedings, despite an ultimately success-.
ful defense thereto,251 should be definitely precluded. Furthermore,
a decision by the Attorney General not to institute criminal actions pertains only to enforcement of the antitrust law by the government. It
is not improbable that private suits may be brought to recover treble
damages for injury to plaintiff's business or property 262 resulting from
activities undertaken pursuant to the officially approved procedure.
See Part I, 40 M1cH. L. REv. 969 at 981 ff.
Among the difficulties to a successful defense, the following may be noted in
particular. Where joint action among industrial units is permitted by the procedure
outlined above, if a court were to hold that the restraint of trade effected was per se
illegal defendants would not be able to offer in evidence the approval of their activities
by the Attorney General since the question of reasonableness would not be in issue. See
decision in the Madison Oil case, supra, p. I I 79. Where requests are made to particular
industrial units, if a court were to hold that the war agency was unauthorized to make
the same, defendants might be found guilty of an unlawful conspiracy on the theory
announced in the Interstate Circuit decision. See quotation, p. 1 194, supra. Priorities, •
allocation of material and facilities, and price agreements are now expressly authorized.
54 Stat. L. 676 (1941), as amended by Pub. 89, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (May 31,
1941), and Pub. 507, § 301, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (Mar. 27, 1942; Pub. 421, 77th
Cong., 2d sess. (Jan. 30, 1942). But cf. the lack of express statutory authorization for
requests for simplification, conservation, substitution and preparation of specifications,
all of which may involve the curtailment of production in certain lines.
252 38 Stat. L. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. (1940), § 15, superseding § 7 of the
Sherman Act. Note also§ 16 of the Clayton Act which provides for private injunctive
relief against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust law. 38 Stat. L
737 (1914), 15 U.S. C. (1940), § 26.
250

251
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The executive branch of the government has indicated a willingness
to put first things first for a successful prosecution of the war effort
by approving the postponement of antitrust investigations and proceedings which would interfere with war production. This represents
but one of the measures which are necessary to accommodate the antitrust law to present emergency conditions. The other must come from
the Congress. By exempting from the proscriptions of the antitrust
law those acts performed within the scope of a request or plan approved
by public officials, the Congress will make possible during the present
war an unfaltering spirit of co-operation on the part of business managers. 258 The President pointed out, in approving the postponement of
certain investigations and proceedings, that unless the war effort is ,
successful our antitrust law will become a matter of only academic
interest. Enactment by the Congress of the suggested exemption law
will also serve to maintain the continued existence of an economy
founded upon private competitive enterprise.
253 Senator Van Nuys has introduced a bill which provides "That whenever the
Chairman of the War Production Board shall certify to the Attorney General in
writing that the doing of any act or thing, or the omission to do any act or thing, by
one or more persons (during the period that this Act is in effect) in compliance with
any written regulation, order, request, or approval of the said Chairman in which it is
specifically set forth that such act, thing, or omission is requisite to the prosecution of the
war, such specific act, thing, or omission shall not be deemed in violation of the antitrust laws of the United States or of the Federal Trade Commission Act, if the Attorney
General shall find that the regulation, order, request, or approval is in effect an order
or a direction requisite to the prosecution of the war, and is not an unlawful delegation
of discretion to a private group." S. 2431, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942). An amendment to the bill placing final authority in one person to exempt given acts from the
antitrust law would be preferable, the writer believes, to the divided authority now
proposed.
See also recommendation by the Business Advisory Council of the Department of
Commerce, set forth in 12 U.S. NEws, No. 12, p. 15, Mar. 20, 1942.

